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PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES ARISING WERE
WE TO ADOPT LOW-DOSE LINEARITY FOR ALL ENDPOINTS
Lorenz R. Rhomberg, Ph.D., FATS  Gradient
 The 2009 National Research Council report, Science and Decisions, proposes harmoniz-
ing dose-response approaches for cancer and non-cancer endpoints, and for non-cancer
quantitative risk assessment, this would usually take the form of a low-dose linear no-
threshold dose-response curve. The soundness of this recommendation has been ques-
tioned, but I focus on its consequences if adopted, many of them apparently unintended.
If most endpoints for most agents are assumed to have non-zero low-dose risks, then the
critical –effect concept, choosing the one endpoint on which to calculate acceptable doses,
loses its basis. All regulatory decisions, since they entail substituting some exposures (and
their attendant risks) for others, become risk-risk trade-off decisions, and equity questions
are raised since risk transfer is inevitably involved. A valid basis for estimating low-dose lin-
ear components is not evident, and upper-bound approaches fail to be reliably public
health-protective owing to the risk trade-off decisions that need to be faced.
Key words: Science and Decisions; Non-cancer; Low-Dose Linearity; Critical Effect; Benefit-Cost
Analysis; Regulatory Benefits; Additivity to Background
INTRODUCTION
A committee deliberating under the auspices of the National
Research Council (NRC) published its recommendations in the NRC
report, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (NRC 2009).
Among the most discussed recommendations in this report is that the
approaches to dose-response analysis and evaluation of safety of low-level
exposures be “harmonized” across assessment of cancer and non-cancer
toxicity endpoints. The committee recommended that, like non-cancer
assessments, quantitative assessment of cancer risks includes an explicit
allowance for interindividual variation in susceptibility to the impact of
carcinogenic agents. In turn, for assessment of non-cancer toxicity, it was
recommended that, as with the case for carcinogens, the evaluation of
impacts of lower doses should be done with an extrapolated dose-
response curve, assigning a varying level of estimated risk to each expo-
sure level. This would stand in contrast to the current reference dose
(RfD) approach used by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (US EPA) – which is similar to approaches used worldwide – in
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which a dose is defined below which no individuals in an exposed popu-
lation are expected to have adverse reactions.
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee had several
motivations for these recommendations. The first was interest in harmo-
nization as such – bringing disparate and somewhat artificially separated
approaches together so that the same set of considerations applies. But
second, and more importantly, it aimed to make non-cancer assessments
more useful to the analysis of benefits of regulation as well as to the eval-
uation of risk-risk trade-offs, comparative cost-effectiveness of alternative
regulatory options, and benefit-cost analysis. A traditional RfD interpret-
ed in the traditional way (or an acceptable daily intake or any similar
measure) provides a “one-way” measure of exposure impact – lower expo-
sures are deemed safe with a reasonable certainty, but higher exposures
are not necessarily unsafe (owing to the use of uncertainty factors, the full
extent of which may not be needed for the agent in question). The
degree of certainty in population protection erodes in an unquantified
way at ever higher exposure levels, followed eventually by the erosion of
protection of more sensitive members of the whole variable population.
But because there is no difference in calculated impact at different expo-
sure levels, especially at levels below the RfD, there is no way to judge the
marginal costs or benefits (in increased or decreased impact on an
exposed population) of small adjustments in the permitted exposure
level. If any exposure below the RfD is deemed equivalent in impact (i.e.,
expecting no impact), then there is no calculable benefit gained from
exposure reduction, nor any cost to allowing somewhat higher exposures
than currently prevail.
Some regulatory programs are mandated to calculate the benefits of
the regulations they promulgate in terms of actual expected improve-
ment in public health – that is, in terms of reduction in the number of
cases of adverse effects or in the severity of those effects. In some cases, a
further analysis of monetized benefits versus costs is also needed, if not by
statute or executive mandate, then at least for the social and political jus-
tification of the regulations. The estimates of benefits, as well as their bal-
ancing with costs, rely on continuous measures of impact, such that
greater or smaller changes in exposure lead to greater or smaller changes
in total population burden of induced disease. The inability of tradition-
al non-cancer risk assessment approaches to provide such measures has
long been seen as problematic for those concerned with benefits analysis.
It is fair to ask why the quantitative analysis of non-cancer toxicity
should be changed from an approach used successfully around the world
for decades only to accommodate the assumptions about dose-depend-
ence that have been built into existing benefit-cost models. One answer is
that, when we are faced with the question of how to adjust exposure in
the range of or even above the RfD – a region where there is some rea-
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sonable probability that impacts may exist – we do indeed benefit from
having some notion of how probable it is that population risks of differ-
ent degrees are being caused or avoided. The question is not only of the
degree of population impact, but also of the confidence we have that the
impact actually exists, in view of the uncertainties in using animal data,
the possible existence of especially sensitive people in the population to
be protected, and other factors addressed by the traditional uncertainty
factors in the RfD process. In my view, this second issue – about gauging
the uncertainties as to whether there are any impacts, rather than about
the magnitude of the impacts themselves – is the more salient, at least
until one considers exposures well above the RfD. Several authors have
proposed probabilistic approaches to RfD determination, in place of the
use of fixed uncertainty factors, as a way of understanding this (Evans et
al. 2001; Baird et al. 1996; Price et al. 1997; Slob and Pieters 1998; Hattis
et al. 2002). The compound-specific adjustment factor approach also
helps in this regard, when the extrapolations covered by the uncertainty
factors can be addressed with case-specific data to estimate them (WHO
2005). The NRC Science and Decisions report acknowledges these
approaches, but it does not develop them much further. Such efforts
show that progress on this front depends on clarifying our understanding
and appropriately separating the specific extrapolations and sources of
uncertainty, as is explored in a recent series of papers (Cooke 2010a,b;
Goble and Hattis 2010; Louis 2010; Rhomberg 2010).
Once the issue of developing a continuous relation of change with
exposure of the risk of inducing a non-cancer toxic effect has been intro-
duced, the question arises, How is this to be done? A number of quantal
dose-response models exist that can be fit to data on response levels at dif-
ferent doses, but the shape of these fitted curves when extrapolated well
below the dose levels of the data points differs markedly among models
and is considered an unreliable index of actual risk. In particular, most
such statistical models assume as a necessary condition that, even though
risk may fall off in a sublinear way with decreasing exposure, there is no
exposure so low as to be without some added probability of response over
the background rate prevailing in unexposed individuals. This property
runs counter to the widely held view among toxicologists that, owing to
the nature of non-cancer toxicity-generating processes, they should have
exposure thresholds: levels of exposure below which the agent is inca-
pable of sufficiently perturbing the biological system to engender an
increased risk of the effect in question.
Belief in the existence of exposure thresholds for many non-cancer
toxicity endpoints is a fundamental tenet for many toxicologists, and it
forms the rationale for the nearly universally applied RfD or acceptable
daily intake (ADI) approach, in which the data at higher doses are used
to identify a dose level that – though not the threshold itself – can be con-
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cluded to be near or below the actual population threshold with an ade-
quate degree of confidence. The belief in such thresholds comes not
merely from lack of observable effects at lower doses (which could be
only an issue of statistical power to observe them reliably), but more
importantly from an understanding of the nature of the underlying
pathobiological changes, the degree of perturbation of normal biological
processes necessary to have consequences on overall physiological func-
tion or dysfunction, and an appreciation of the robustness of the living
system and its ability to counter or accommodate stressors without losing
function.
The Benchmark Dose approach (Crump 1984; US EPA 2000),
increasingly used by regulatory agencies, introduces a means to reconcile
the contradictions of no-threshold mathematical dose-response models
with the biological understanding of exposure thresholds for most non-
cancer toxicity. The models’ results are recognized as applying reliably
only in the region of exposures where they demonstrably fit the data used
in their parameter estimation. The fitted curves are followed downward
only to the limits of that reliability, at which point they define the dose
associated with a “benchmark response” that is a response level on the
curve that can be estimated with reliability and that is not pronouncedly
different for different fitted models – that is, it is understood as part of
the observable relationship at higher exposures and not an assumption-
contingent low-dose extrapolation. The associated “benchmark dose”
producing this level of response (or the lower statistical bound on such a
dose) can then be treated in a way appropriate to our larger biological
knowledge. Any inferences about the potential for impacts below the
benchmark dose can be couched as science policy decisions about how to
characterize that potential in view of available understanding, and not as
a falsely claimed observation of actual risks at much lower doses. In short,
the Benchmark Dose approach resolves the conflict between no-thresh-
old statistical models and threshold toxicological processes by confining
its attention to the span of exposure levels where they are not in conflict
and eschewing the claim that such observations of frank effects at high
doses can by themselves (i.e., without consideration of additional knowl-
edge regarding underlying modes of action) directly address what may
happen at lower doses.
The Science and Decisions report (NRC 2009), however, takes a broad-
er view of the issue of continuous risk variation with exposure level, aim-
ing to make it (like cancer risk dose-response curves) applicable to all
doses, no matter how low. To do this requires taking on the question of
how to develop a basis for the plausible extrapolation of non-cancer
effect dose-response curves well below the range of direct observation.
Science and Decisions proposes three general options for extrapolating low-
dose risks of both carcinogens and non-carcinogens (conceptual models
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1, 2, and 3). Model 1 proposes thresholds for some individuals, but not
on a population basis. Model 2 proposes both individual and population
thresholds. Model 3 proposes linear and non-threshold responses for the
individual and the population. In practice, one must essentially ascertain
that the chemical’s effects do not follow any of the mechanisms that are
posited as causing linearity to accept it as a case for Model 2. In practice,
it is likely that this will almost always lead to the adoption of either Model
1 or 3, both of which assume linearity at the population level.
The reasoning put forward for linearity at low doses, even for non-
cancer toxicity endpoints usually assumed to have an exposure threshold,
involves several lines of argument, but the primary one is additivity to
background disease processes. This argument proposes that, if an agent
acts to enhance or exacerbate any ongoing underlying process that is
itself part of the causation of background cases of the endpoint in ques-
tion (i.e., cases appearing even in unexposed individuals), then even a
small amount of the agent will, by moving this causative underlying
process along ever so slightly, lead to a small marginal increase in the rate
of appearance of the endpoint in the exposed population. In essence,
even if there is a threshold, this argument proposes that, owing to varia-
tion among individuals in key causative underlying physiological states,
some individuals are already past the threshold of tolerable variation in
the states in question and so have “spontaneous” cases of the endpoint.
There are others whose values for the key variables are just marginally
adequate, and if an agent moves these values however slightly in the
wrong direction, they too will pass the threshold and succumb to the end-
point.
My purpose here is not to argue the merits of this point of view,
although I have done so elsewhere (e.g., Rhomberg 2004, 2009), and fur-
ther discussion is forthcoming. For the moment, it is sufficient to note
that the logic for low-dose linearity of non-cancer-effect dose-response
curves has not been universally accepted and has been a matter of much
discussion since Science and Decisions appeared. It is also important to note
that the arguments for such linearity are arguments in principle for the
existence of a low-dose linear component to the overall dose-response
relationship – they do not themselves determine how large such a com-
ponent should be or even lead to a way to estimate it. They only argue
that some unmeasured effect ought to be supposed to exist.
Instead, my purpose here is to ask, If we were to accept this principle,
and consequently establish as a science policy that most non-cancer toxi-
city endpoints have no exposure threshold, what effects would this have
on risk assessment approaches and, more importantly, on risk manage-
ment processes? After all, risk assessment is done for the purpose of aid-
ing and enabling risk management actions based, to the extent possible,
on scientific understanding of the nature and magnitude of risks at expo-
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sure levels actually experienced. It is important to ask, before adopting a
novel approach, how the new method will be usable in actual risk man-
agement decision processes, what issues it will solve, and what new issues
it will raise. As will be shown below, several consequences of accepting
widespread low-dose linearity for non-cancer toxicity do not yet seem to
have been widely recognized and may be unintended by its proponents.
The current state of regulatory risk assessment avoids many of the
issues discussed below by assuming that sufficiently low exposures will be
without effect. If, as has been advocated by some, low-dose linearity for all
endpoints is established as a general or default procedure – to be invoked
unless sufficient proof of thresholds can be adduced – then the issues I
discuss below will arise as a logical consequence of that assumption. This
will be true whether or not actual regulatory practice is changed, but if
processes are not changed, they will be logically at odds with the low-dose
linearity approach being invoked.
(1) THE LOW-DOSE LINEAR COMPONENT CANNOT BE MEASURED
The additivity-to-background argument is about the potential exis-
tence in non-cancer dose-response curves of a low-dose linear component
of unspecified magnitude, but even if one accepts the logic for its exis-
tence, the reasoning does not provide a means for measuring the size of
the component – that is, the low-dose potency of the agent to cause
increases in response rate over the background incidence of the endpoint
in question among unexposed individuals. The magnitude of the
increased risk with low exposures, if there are any, depends on interac-
tions of small amounts of the agent with generally unknown underlying
physiological processes that account for the existence of background
cases, and it will be these interactions in the human population, involving
the causes of human background cases, that will be at issue, rather than
the high-dose interactions in experimental animals on which most infer-
ence of human hazard is based. The high-dose shape of the dose-
response curve, and even its low-dose extrapolation to background
response rates in experimental rodent systems, does not provide any sub-
stantial information about these matters.
At present, it is not clear how proponents of linear low-dose extrapo-
lation plan to handle this obstacle. One can imagine various calculation
strategies, but none avoids a high degree of arbitrariness, since the infor-
mation needed is not available in the data one typically has at hand. In
practice (in the interest of “harmonization”), it is likely that a process sim-
ilar to that used by US EPA for carcinogens will be adopted, i.e., a line will
be drawn from the “point of departure” (benchmark dose and its
response over background) down to the origin, and its slope used as the
“upper bound” on a low-dose potency. This procedure is likely to vastly
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overestimate the actual degree of risk, if any. As will be argued below, the
usual defense of this process as “conservative” (i.e., erring on the side of
being overly protective of public health), is not tenable when it is applied
to all agents.
The consequence is that a measure of risk is to be given great impor-
tance, yet it is not measurable other than in an arbitrary way.
(2) THE POTENCY IS NOT THE SAME FOR EVERYONE IN AN EXPOSED
POPULATION
The existence of the low-dose linear component is alleged on the
basis of the existence of marked variability among individuals in their
internal physiological states, such that some people will be just on the
verge of a “spontaneous” case of the disease in question and pushed over
the line by the small exposure to the agent. Thus, even if this is so, only
those very marginal people will be at risk, while the main body of people
will not be. The factors that cause variation in vulnerability will vary
among populations, and so they cannot reliably be expected to have the
same impact from one population to another. Moreover, any actual dis-
tribution of vulnerabilities must include increasing proportions of the
population that are farther away from the critical level – one is after all
dealing with the extreme tail of a statistical distribution that, in order for
the additivity-to-background argument to work, must represent continu-
ous variation in degree of vulnerability. Put another way, the slope of the
cumulative distribution function of vulnerabilities changes as one moves
from the tail toward the middle, and it is this slope that dictates the mar-
ginal increase in risk with each increasing unit of exposure – that is, the
potency. This means that the potency is different for smaller or larger
exposures. The magnitude of the “linearity” arising from additivity-to-
background and the interaction with population variability is very local to
a particular exposure level, with the slope of the linear component (the
marginal increase in risk for the next unit of added dose) changing for
different dose levels. This effect would be completely missed by the point-
of-departure linear extrapolation approach, which imposes a single con-
stant potency on all doses below the benchmark dose. Any single linear
potency estimate will misstate the actual potency to different degrees for
different dose levels. It is hard to see how such a measure, combined with
the inability to estimate even such a faulty measure, would be useful for
the benefits-estimation purposes that constitute the main justification for
the low-dose extrapolation approach articulated by the Science and
Decisions report.
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(3) THE CONCEPT OF A “CRITICAL EFFECT” WILL NO LONGER BE TENABLE
Non-cancer risk assessment has depended on the concept of the “crit-
ical effect”: the endpoint that produces an adverse impact at the lowest
dose among all the endpoints that may have been observed. This critical
effect can serve as the basis for the reference dose, on the logic that any
control of exposure that protects against it will protect against all other
effects as well, since they appear only at yet higher doses. But if all doses
are presumed to engender some risk – a risk that may diminish at lower
doses but never entirely vanishes – then there is no longer a basis for
focusing only on one endpoint, since all endpoints will have risks that are
extrapolated to low doses without thresholds. Endpoints appearing at
measurable levels at higher doses than the “most sensitive” one nonethe-
less have impacts at lower doses, albeit perhaps with lower frequencies of
occurrence at any given low dose. The probability of being unaffected by
an exposure is the complement of developing at least one of the end-
points that appear at higher doses, all of which each person would be pre-
sumed to be at some dose-dependent risk of developing.
If additivity-to-background and consequent low-dose linearity is pre-
sumed to apply to most critical effects (as they have been formerly
defined), then there is no obvious basis to deny the principle’s applica-
bility to other endpoints, and the total risk of an adverse effect at low
doses will always be bigger than that calculated from only the “most sen-
sitive” endpoint by an amount that depends on how many other end-
points there are and what the low-dose risk projection from each individ-
ual endpoint may be.
Once this door is opened, a host of other difficult questions arises.
Are the several endpoints statistically independent of one another in
their occurrence? If so, a ready (though complex) means of calculating
their joint probability is available (one minus the product of n terms,
each of which is one minus the risk for each of the n endpoints, and then
corrected by a series of two-way, three-way, etc. cross-product terms).
Statistical independence would be expected if each of the endpoints aris-
es at low doses because of susceptible people being vulnerable in differ-
ent underlying physiological states, but if to any extent the state of the
same contributing variables is influential for more than one of the end-
points, they ought to be partially correlated, and the total risk calculation
would need to account for this, even though the basis for doing so is not
clear. Negative as well as positive correlations are biologically plausible, so
there is no clear basis to define even a dependably conservative answer to
this.
Should all endpoints observed in any animal system be included in
this calculation? For instance, should risks based on rat liver enlargement
be combined with risks based on mouse behavioral changes? And should
these be combined with risks from rat heart arrhythmias seen in a study
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that failed to detect liver enlargement? When one can identify a critical
effect (in a most-sensitive sex, strain, and species), as long as that effect is
deemed sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis of the assessment, one
does not need to adjudicate the further relevance and bearing of each
and every endpoint that has been observed in any test system. As a con-
sequence, elaborate weight-of-evidence and hazard-identification
schemes to evaluate particular endpoints and their consistency across test
systems have not been seen as necessary in non-cancer risk assessment.
But if all endpoints are potentially sources of low-dose risk, it is necessary
to make a weight-of-evidence decision about the human relevance of each
endpoint separately, only eliminating endpoints from the overall risk cal-
culation if they are deemed insufficiently supported to constitute an indi-
cation of a potential human risk. Moreover, for each endpoint that is
deemed relevant, it is necessary to identify the corresponding human
adverse effects and their spontaneous background rates of occurrence,
because it is these human effects that human doses are being presumed
to exacerbate based on the analogy of effects in animals. In short, if low-
dose linearity for all (valid) endpoints is to be entertained, the need for
an elaborate method to judge the applicability of each potential endpoint
is created.
The critical-endpoint concept affects the design and conduct of ani-
mal testing, and with its loss, difficult test-design questions are created.
Current testing is largely aimed at identifying critical endpoints for each
test system, and so it is not necessary to run many at much higher doses
to see if additional endpoints crop up. Again, the reasoning is that, if end-
points have thresholds, then effects seen at higher doses will only appear
at dose levels already higher than would be allowed in view of the critical
endpoint. But if all endpoints have a low-dose linear component, then
this justification is removed. The lack of observation of increases at lower
doses for a high-dose endpoint would be seen only as a matter of chance,
and it would seem appropriate to require testing of higher and higher
doses to determine whether additional endpoints become statistically
detectable. Indeed, failure to do so could be argued to constitute failure
to identify sources of low-dose risk, since these high-dose endpoints
would presumably contribute to low-dose risk estimation.
If this tack were taken, however, there is no clear way to keep it from
devolving into meaninglessness. At ever higher dose levels, increasing
physiological failure will be engendered, increasingly massive toxicity will
be observed, and, at some point, one needs to concede that the effects
being caused are not ones that appear with some probability at all dose
levels but are high-dose-only overwhelming assaults on the living system –
i.e., they are endpoints with (very high) exposure thresholds. There is no
clear basis, however, to draw a line between endpoints in the “regular”
higher-dose range (which would be presumed to have a linear low-dose
9
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component, according to the presumed generality of additivity-to-back-
ground) and endpoints in the “too high” dose range (which would be
presumed to have exposure thresholds).
In short, under linear low-dose extrapolation, all high-dose effects
have some impact on the total risk at low doses, since none has a thresh-
old, and so added pressure is put on the question of determining all the
effects that exist and on deciding their relevance to humans. The practice
of figuring that protecting from the most sensitive effect also protects
against all others loses its justification, since the most sensitive effect
alone contributes only part of the total low-dose risk. How much practical
difference this makes depends on how many additional toxicities are
brought into consideration and how much less may be their individual
contributions to estimates of total low-dose risk, with the possibility that,
although each is small, they total to a substantial amount of impact.
(4) CONTROL DECISIONS WOULD BECOME RISK-RISK TRADE-OFF 
DECISIONS
Whenever one considers limiting the exposure to a compound on the
grounds of its potential to cause public health impact, this is either
implicitly or explicitly a simultaneous consideration to cause greater
exposure to some other agents in the form of substitutes or alternative
product formulations or even just results of shifts in activity patterns. We
are always exposing ourselves to some set of compounds in the environ-
ment, day in and day out without cease, and this is in some sense a zero-
sum game; any diminution of one source of exposure leads to increases
in others. Sometimes, at least with some thought, the exposure shifts may
be obvious and even measurable; for instance, banning a crop-protection
chemical leads to greater exposure to other chemicals used for the same
purpose, or, if not that, to greater levels of secondary metabolites pro-
duced by crop plants under the stress of attack by pests, or, if not even
that, the exposures to chemicals associated with alternative foodstuffs to
which a consumer switches. In current practice, only substitutes satisfying
the “reasonable certainty of no harm” criterion would be permitted, but
with low-dose linearity for all endpoints, there would be no substitutes
that did not raise some additional risk question to be factored in to the
decision. In other cases, the shifts in exposure may be very difficult to
identify with any specificity, much less to measure.
Every compound shows some kind of toxicity at sufficiently high
doses. If these high-dose effects are presumed to occur with some lower
probability at any lower dose, then every exposure to every compound is
associated with some degree of risk of the effects seen for those com-
pounds at higher doses. Since every decision about limiting exposure to
a particular agent entails greater exposure to other agents, such a deci-
10
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sion is also a decision to prefer to lower the risks from the agent being
controlled at the expense of raising the exposures to, and hence the risks
from, other chemicals. That is, every decision to alter an exposure neces-
sarily entails a risk-risk trade-off. Whether the trade-off provides a net
public health benefit or not depends on the particulars – what is being
avoided and what is being increased. The difficulty is that, as we have
already noted, the actual levels of risk cannot really be estimated even for
the agents specifically under scrutiny, and this problem is compounded
when the trade-offs entail larger exposure to unnamed, perhaps unstud-
ied, compounds with an unknown degree of increased risk that would be
attributed to them by the no-threshold presumptions being broadly
applied.
We avoid this quandary today by believing that small shifts in expo-
sures that are well below recognized thresholds for adverse effects do not
entail any alteration of risk. Thus, we can entertain a regulation to limit
an exposure, and hence reduce the public health impact, for a specific
chemical with some confidence that we may be making things better and
are unlikely to be making them worse. Most of the time (with identifiable
exceptions), we believe that the small shifts in exposure to other agents
that arise as a consequence of the action to limit one particular agent
leave all of the other exposures well in their sub-threshold range and
hence provide no countervailing problem to be balanced with the bene-
fit of the chemical-specific limit being contemplated. But if everything
has linear risks at low doses, then this assurance cannot be had, and there
is no alternative (if one seeks net public health benefit) to identifying the
exposures and risks being raised so that the one target exposure and risk
can be lowered, and further to measure the plusses and minuses to arrive
at a judgment about whether a net benefit is being created.
As noted earlier, it is very problematic to measure the low-dose risks
being traded off in such a setting. “Upper-bound” estimates of low-dose
risk potential for each agent make poor bases for judging the trade-off,
because the degree of over-estimation of risk is likely to differ, perhaps
sharply, for the different agents being considered, and even the relative
size of the overestimates will rarely be apparent. For this reason, use of
upper-bound low-dose risk estimates is not dependably protective of pub-
lic health, and the use of such upper bounds makes the outcomes of the
risk-risk trade-off analysis essentially arbitrary.
(5) UNANSWERABLE EQUITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONSID-
ERATIONS WILL BE RAISED
The assumption of low-dose linearity for non-cancer effects rests on
the notion that there are people in an exposed population who are just
on the margins of sustainable values of some key physiological variables,
11
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and that small pushes by environmental agents will push them over into
having an adverse response. Such people must be classified as vulnerable
sub-populations if they are somehow identifiable, either as individuals or
as a class; it is their protection that is sought by limits on low-level expo-
sure that would be tolerable by most other people. But the risk-risk trade-
offs inherent in a world where all endpoints are assumed to be low-dose
linear (as outlined in the preceding paragraphs) means that the protec-
tion of the people vulnerable to a given chemical, obtained by limitation
of its use, results not only in other risks, but in other risks to other people –
those with different vulnerabilities that leave them at risk to the increased
exposure to substitute chemicals. That is, not only is there an issue of risk-
risk trade-off, there is a further issue of the equity and justification of
reducing one person’s risk by increasing another’s. Some questions are
raised by this realization of the inevitability of risk-transfer. Does it matter
whether one risk is of a minor adversity to many people while another is
a major impact on a few? How is net benefit to be calculated? What is the
responsibility of a regulator to try to identify the kinds of people who will
have risk reduced and especially those who will have risk increased? In
particular, is it acceptable simply to avoid investigating the question of
whose risk is being increased and by how much? Does it ameliorate the
problem if the vulnerable cannot be identified but are just an unidenti-
fied fraction of the population as a whole?
The concept of environmental justice is predicated on the idea that
certain ethnic or economic groups might have special vulnerabilities, or
different frequencies of individuals with vulnerabilities, and so the trans-
fer of risk from those with presumed vulnerabilities to the agent to those
with vulnerabilities to the substitutes is relevant. In any case, there is an
equity consideration even if the vulnerabilities cannot be assigned to par-
ticular recognizable sub-populations.
DISCUSSION
Lest any reader be mistaken, let me reiterate that I am not convinced
by the arguments put forth by those who would assert low-dose linearity
for all endpoints. This is not a matter of fleeing the conclusions, but
rather one of questioning the applicability of the arguments to non-can-
cer toxicity processes as we currently understand them. I have not devot-
ed the present paper to the critique of the basis for the universal low-dose
linearity argument, which is discussed elsewhere, but rather to a thinking-
through of the consequences of such a stance, should it be accepted as a
regulatory policy despite the qualms I and others have expressed about
its soundness.
Most of the problems I discuss above arise as a result of the proposed
broad application of the no-threshold/low-dose linearity principle. If it is
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taken as a default or if it is applied to most environmental agents and
most toxicity endpoints, it runs into the problem that every action affects
everything else, and every change results in a bad outcome for someone.
In my view, the proponents have not thought through the consequences
of applying this idea to more than one compound and endpoint at a time,
even though the logic of their position dictates that they need to do so.
By looking only at one dimension at a time – one agent to which more
or less exposure can occur and one endpoint affected by it – it is possible
to think that one is being protective by assuming a linear/no-threshold
dose-response. But if this idea is widely applied, then the world is cast as sit-
ting on a multidimensional knife’s edge in which any change in one dimen-
sion affects everything else with no level of tolerance. The logical conse-
quence of this view is that any action of any kind will result in some good
to some and some ill to others, without any evident way of calculating how
much of each is engendered and to whom fall the benefits and dangers.
As noted at the outset, a large part of the stated motivation for adopt-
ing low-dose linear extrapolation, as expressed in the Science and Decisions
report, is to enable the measurement of the benefit of regulations and to
aid matching costs of controls to the degree of benefits received. It is iron-
ic that the means being proffered cannot produce measurements of the
risks invoked, cannot identify the impacts that are implied, and in gener-
al cannot achieve the aims that at least nominally motivated them in the
first place. What is really needed is characterization of the nonlinearities
in the local region of exposure levels in play in the risk management
application, since it is the interaction of curve shapes that yield insights
into optimal actions. Moreover, since trade-offs among influences are
inevitably involved, it is important to have central estimates of these
effects, or, even better, to have distributional estimates of tenable descrip-
tions of them along with characterization of our uncertainty about the
reliability of the estimates.
Do we really need universal low-dose linearity to address these risk
management analyses? All that is really needed is continuous (not neces-
sarily linear) measures of risk magnitude as a function of dose, and these
are only needed in the local region of exposure levels that one is consid-
ering for the immediate question at hand. Linearizing everything over a
wide low-dose range is actually destructive of the applicability to the moti-
vating risk-management questions. As I have attempted to show, there are
also a host of unintended consequences of adopting this stance, and it is
important to keep these larger questions in view as science policy options
are evaluated in the near future.
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